From Joyo

4 Testimonies:

- Testimony of Mr. Octovianus Mote [West Papua Action Network]

- Testimony of Mr. Henkie Rumbewas [International Advocate Australia
West Papua Association (AWPA)]

- Testimony of Pieter Joost Drooglever [Professor Emeritus, Institute
of Netherlands History, The Hague]

-  Testimony of S. Eben Kirksey, Ph.D. [The Graduate Center, City
University of New York]

---

Testimony of Mr. Octovianus Mote
Founder, West Papua Action Network
President, Papua Resource Center
Founding Member, West Papua Advocacy Team

before the
U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment

September 22, 2010

“Crimes Against Humanity: When Will Indonesia’s Military Be Held
Accountable for Deliberate and Systematic Abuses in West Papua?”

Introduction
Special autonomy in West Papua has failed. This was the conclusion
drawn in November 2007 by several parties: the Papuan Traditional
Council (Dewan Adat Papua), Association of Central Highland University
Students (AMP), and the Papuan Peoples Council (PDP). In June and July
2010, some 20,000 people took to the streets of West Papua and
formally returned the Special Autonomy law to the Indonesian
government.

Background
The dictatorship of President Suharto, who ruled Indonesia for 32
years, came to an end in 1998 amidst a widely-popular reform movement
that swept this island nation. The era of comparative freedom that
came with the end of Suharto’s rule opened up new political
opportunities for the people of East Timor, Papua, and Aceh.
Nationalist movements developed grass-roots support in each of these
territories.

Public demonstrations in Papua, which featured the flying of the
morning star flag, were staged throughout the territory in 1998. A
delegation of 100 Papuan leaders met with President B. J. Habibie in
1999 where they declared their aspirations to leave the Republic of
Indonesia. Thousands flocked to Papua’s capital of Jayapura in May
2000 for the Second Papuan Congress, an event where a leadership for
the independence movement was formally selected. Indonesian officials
decided that offering Papua a comprehensive autonomy package was the
best response to popular demands for an independence referendum. At
the same time Indonesian military terror campaigns, and targeted
assassinations, forced the political movement for independence
underground.

A Toothless Autonomy Package

The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the highest law-making body
in Indonesia, issued the Assembly Decree No. 4/1999 that called for
giving broad powers to local government officials in Papua.  In drafts
of the autonomy bill local Papuan officials were given authority in
all aspects of governance, except with respect to foreign policy,
external defense, financial matters, and the judiciary. A transfer of
authority of this nature had never before been applied in the history
of the Republic of Indonesia. Initially it gave provinces throughout
Indonesia, hope of gaining independence from a top-heavy central
bureaucracy in Jakarta. This autonomy bill was passed into law in 2001
by Indonesia’s Parliamentary Assembly (DPR-RI).  However, the contents
of the final bill left much to be desired. Earlier drafts of the bill
contained many specific provisions that were lost in the final
version.

Indonesian security forces have historically been controlled from
Jakarta with no formal oversight from civilian authorities. A draft of
the autonomy package placed the Chief of Police in Papua directly
under the authority of the Governor. This move was in line with a
national initiative to separate the police from the three branches of
the armed forces: the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. At the time,
policy makers were making moves to limit the role of the armed forces
in domestic affairs. The final autonomy bill kept the status quo with
respect to security policy. The police and military forces in West
Papua continue to operate separately from the Governor, without any
direct civilian oversight. Troop deployments continue to be
coordinated from Jakarta.

In an attempt to end the impunity enjoyed by Indonesian security
forces, a draft of the autonomy legislation contained provisions for
the establishment of an independent human rights commission for Papua.
Plans for an institution with the authority to investigate allegations
of human rights violations and present findings to a Provincial Human
Rights Court of Justice were developed. However, the final autonomy
bill eliminated the key provision of independence of a regional human
rights body. A branch of Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission
(Komnas HAM) was opened in Papua following the implementation of the
autonomy legislation, without any specific mandate or tasks. The
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Court of Justice was extremely
limited. The new court lacked the ability to prosecute abuses by
security forces and government officials. Impunity for soldiers and
their commanders is still the order of the day in Papua.

Drafts of the autonomy bill proposed a bicameral system of provincial
government: an indigenous council called the Papuan People’s
Consultative Council (MRP) was to be established alongside the
existing People’s Parliamentary Representative Council (DPRP). The MRP
was established, but its role was limited to cultural affairs with no
decision-making power and authority whatsoever. Currently the MRP
merely provides advice to the administration and the DPRP.

Economic Provisions

Article 34 of the autonomy package that was passed in 1999 stipulated
that the majority of revenue generated by the extraction of natural
resources in Papua would be given back to the provincial government
and the people. The bill contained provisions for sustainable and
environmentally sound development programs. Article 42 of the bill
opens up opportunities for participation by local communities in every
initiative of capital investment in their respective regions. An
affirmative action program was established for indigenous Papuans who
wish to pursue higher education, opportunities in government, and
funds for entrepreneurs. The current Governor of Papua, Barnabas
Suebu, recently announced that 100 million Rupiah ($10,000 US) would
be provided to each village in the whole province of Papua as a result
of revenue from the autonomy program.

Failed Implementation of the Autonomy Law

The administration of Indonesian president President Megawati
Sukarnoputri was reluctant to implement the special autonomy bill that
had been passed by the national legislature in 1999. President
Sukarnoputri finally signed the bill into law in 2002. One year later
the Sukarnoputri administration showed ill-will to the implementation
of the autonomy law with the issuance of presidential instruction
number 1/2003 which split up the territory of Papua into separate
provinces. When General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became the President
of Indonesia in 2004, many Papuans hoped that he would make a genuine
effort to implement the Special Autonomy law.  After Yudhoyono
allocated funds for splitting Papua into separate provinces, the
people lost hope that he would take autonomy in the territory
seriously.

The distribution of the revenue that has flowed back from Jakarta
following the implementation of the autonomy law has been mismanaged.
As a result the primary beneficiaries of the autonomy funds are a
group of Papuan elites who hold various positions in the government
bureaucracy. Governor Suebu has established a team to fight corruption
that consists of police officers, a special court of justice, and
public prosecutors. This team is tasked with investigating allegations
of corruption and prosecuting those who have misused public funds. The
Governor has also implemented new safeguards to prevent further misuse
of funds.  Additionally, Governor Suebu is attempting to prevent the
misappropriation of funds by the security forces.

Recent Evaluations of the Autonomy Law

In 2007 the Governor of Papua formed a team to study the
implementation of the autonomy law. This evaluation team consisted of
members of the Papuan People’s Consultative Council (MRP), scholars at
Cenderawasih University, as well as youth activists from the
Association of College and University Students of the Papuan Central
Highlands (AMP). Mr. John Djopari, a government official who was
formerly the Indonesian ambassador to PNG, served as Chairman of the
Papua Special Autonomy Evaluation Team. The team concluded that the
implementation of the bill had failed. The Republic of Indonesia,
concluded Mr. Djopari, has squandered the funds from the autonomy bill
to form new, unnecessary, district administrative units. The
bottom-line issue is that civilian officials have failed to establish
meaningful and authoritative control over the unruly armed forces
which continue to operate with impunity.

Proposed Solutions: The Role of the International Community

Papuans have lost faith in the will of the Indonesian government to
resolve long-standing grievances: autocratic rule by distant officials
in Jakarta, security forces that continue to operate with impunity, as
well as laws that limit basic political and religious freedoms. The
Papuan Traditional Council (Dewan Adat Papua), a grassroots political
organization representing the 253 indigenous groups in West Papua, has
recently reiterated a call for a dialog between the Republic of
Indonesia and the Papuan people. Such a dialog would only be possible,
according to the Papuan Traditional Council, if it is mediated by a
neutral third party.

Mr. Chairman, therefore we would like to thank you for your recent
letter to President Obama, encouraging him to “make West Papua one of
the highest priorities of the Administration.”  We also thank the
other fifty members of the U.S. Congress who signed this letter—asking
the President to meet with the people of West Papua during his
upcoming trip to Indonesia.  We sincerely hope that the President
takes your request to heart.

Thank you.

--------------

Testimony of Mr. Henkie Rumbewas
International Advocate Australia West Papua Association (AWPA)

before the
U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment

September 22, 2010

“Crimes Against Humanity: When Will Indonesia’s Military Be Held
Accountable for Deliberate and Systematic Abuses in West Papua?”

Allow me to extend the greetings and gratitude from the People of West
Papua.

“Koya,  “Jow Suba, and “Achemo” from the People of West Papua to you,
Chairman Eni Faleomavaega, to you Chairman Donald Payne, and to all
members of the US Congress who have supported West Papuans.

We owe particular gratitude to the 50 Members of Congress who signed
the recent letter about West Papua to the President of the United
States: Mr Barrack Obama.
I was born on September 27th, 1956 on the Island of Biak, West Papua.
I was only seven years old when the Indonesian military invaded West
Papua in 1962.  My father was a health worker at the local hospital
during the Dutch administration.   In the middle of the night since
October 1963, my father was taken by the Arm Forces and sent to prison
with many other West Papuans on the island of Biak. This was the first
nightmare I experienced—living without a father from 1963 until 1970.
My father was sent to jail simply because he made public statements
rejecting Indonesian military rule in West Papua.  In 1970, a year
after the Free Act of “No Choice,” my father was released. The story
of my father is only one example of many other West Papuans who were
imprisoned in the past.  Even today, there are still many more
political prisoners in West Papua.

In 1967, my uncle Permenas Awom began leading an armed struggle
against the Indonesian military rule in Manokwari.  Permenas was later
persuaded by the Suharto’s government to surrender peacefully.  But he
later disappeared without any trace while in custody of the Indonesian
Armed Forces.

In 1969, Nataniel Awom, the younger brother of Permenas, was leading
an armed struggle against Indonesian military rule in the island of
Biak. He was also persuaded and surrendered peacefully. Towards the
Christmas of 1969, he also disappeared in the hands of Indonesian arm
forces without any trace. The two uncles mentioned above are just the
examples many other West Papuans in other areas who lost their lives
during Indonesian military operations in the early 1960’s.

Between 1964 and 1967, a cousin and a close friend of mine, Arnold Ap,
formed a Papuan cultural music group known as Mambesak.  Arnold Ap was
basically promoting Papuan folk songs and collecting Papuan artifacts.
Arnold later studied anthropology and taught at Cenderawasih
University in West Papua’s capitol of Jayapura.  Arnold Ap was simply
trying to promote the indigenous culture of Melanesian people.  The
military government saw that Arnold Ap was promoting the Papuan
culture and that it was popular among the West Papuan people.
Therefore, in April 1983, Arnold was murdered along with his cousin
Eduard Mofu and two other West Papuans in his cultural group. Their
bodies were badly tortured, burnt, and thrown at the beach near the
town of Jayapura. The military perpetrators of this crime were
promoted following this murder.

After the murder of Arnold Ap, I decided to become an advocate for his
case and other human rights abuses in West Papua on an international
scale.  In 1984, the Catholic church of Australia sponsored me to live
in exile in Australia. Since then, I have adopted Australia as my new
home. Many other West Papuans have fled West Papua for their safety to
the neighboring country of Papua New Guinea, Australia, and the
Netherlands. There are thousands of West Papuan refugees inside the
independent state of Papua New Guinea today.  The Indonesian
government from time to time has tried to persuade the Papua New
Guinea government to repatriate many of these refugees back to West
Papua.

The future of the West Papuan refugees is always uncertain.  Many of
them are stateless and not recognized under the UN International
convention on refugees.  Some government officials in Papua New Guinea
regard them simply as “Border-Crossers.”

The Indonesian government has been opening up new lands in West Papua
just to shelter new settlers from the over crowded islands of Java and
other parts of Indonesia.  We, the West Papuans, are becoming
minorities in our own homeland.  In the 1971 census there were 887,000
indigenous West Papuans (‘Irian born’) out of a total population of
923,000 – or 96%.   The 2010 census figures so far released only give
a total population figure without breaking that figure down into
respective ethnic groups.  An analysis of these data, just published
last week by Dr. James Elmslie, suggests that we are now only 49.55%
of population in our homeland.

Mr. Chairman, I do sincerely hope that our testimony before you today
would not be just a showcase to entertain us as indigenous people of
West Papua, but a firm action should be taken by the Congress of the
United States of America and the government of the United States of
America to end support for the Indonesian military.  In this context
Mr. Chairman, allow me to extend our gratitude to you for sponsoring
H.Res. 1355.  We hope this Resolution, about free speech and political
prisoners, will pass through the US Congress.
At the moment, the people of West Papua are demanding a referendum on
the issue of independence in West Papua.  Mr. Chairman, Indonesian
officials are frustrating our attempts to hold a genuine political
dialog about our future.  A democratic vote on the issue of
independence is now the only means to defend our rights and existence
as a race of people in our own God given land.

Thank you.


----------------

Testimony of Pieter Joost Drooglever
Professor Emeritus Institute of Netherlands History
The Hague

before the
U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment

September 22, 2010

“Crimes Against Humanity: When Will Indonesia’s Military Be Held
Accountable for Deliberate and Systematic Abuses in West Papua?”

In November 2000 the Minister of Foreign Affairs commissioned the
Institute of Netherlands History in The Hague to write a historical
study about the transfer of West Papua from the Netherlands to
Indonesia. It was felt that such a study was needed to inform a wider
public on the subject and to prevent eventual misunderstandings in the
discussions that were going on at the time. The job was given to me.
Five years later the Dutch edition of the book was ready. An English
translation was published in 2009 by Oneworld Publishers in Oxford
under the title An Act of Free Choice. Decolonization and the Right to
Self-Determination in West Papua. I have submitted a copy of this book
to the Chairman of this honourable Committee for the record.

It must be noted here, that the Institute of Netherlands History
accepted the commission on the condition that the author would have
absolute freedom to write as he deemed best.  Another condition was
that he would have access to all information, available to the
Netherlands Government and would have its full support for getting
access to archives and other information, available in other countries
as well. Such support was given indeed by the Governments and
Archivists of the United States, Australia, Belgium and the United
Kingdom. The Government of Indonesia, however, refused formal requests
from the author to visit West Papua to interview Indonesian citizens
of his choice. The author was also denied access to Indonesian
government archives.

The book gives an overall picture of the history of west New Guinea—a
territory that was only brought under effective rule of the
Netherlands in the 20th century.  The focus of the book is thus on the
post war history of the territory.  It explores West Papua’s exclusion
from the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, the subsequent
conflict with Indonesia, and the origins of the New York Agreement
which was signed in 1962. The parties to this agreement decided to
hand over the territory to Indonesia through the intermediary of a
temporary United Nations administration. The New York Agreement
stipulated that after a period of Indonesian rule there would be a
plebiscite for the Papuans, in which they would be able to choose
between permanent integration within the Indonesian state or not. That
plebiscite, called the Act of Free Choice, had to be organized by
Indonesia under the terms laid down in the New York Agreement, and
carried out under the supervision of the United Nations. The Act of
Free Choice took place in 1969, and it resulted in a unanimous vote in
favour of permanent inclusion in Indonesia. None of the United Nations
observers present in the field, nor observers from abroad, believed
the result. The evidence allows for no other conclusion than that the
outcome was in no way representative of the real feelings of the
population. The selected Papuan voters - numbering just over one
thousand people out of a population of nearly one million - opted for
Indonesia under strong pressure from soldiers and officials. Under the
eyes of the United Nations the Act of Free Choice perpetuated an era
of repression and deprivation for the Papuans that essentially
continues until the present day.

In this story, a few points are relevant for the Hearing today.

1. The final period of Dutch administration between 1950 and 1962 was
a somewhat belated effort in preparing the Papuans for
self-determination. It led to the creation of a small, but rapidly
expanding, young Papuan elite who entered the administration and
educational system in increasing numbers. By 1960 over 4000 jobs in
the lower and lower middle ranks of the Administration were occupied
by Papuans. They developed a communal feeling and a nationalism of
their own. Political life sprang up, and a National Committee decided
for a flag and an anthem for the Papuans. Upon instigation of the
Dutch, plans were developed for self determination in or around 1970.
For the Papuan elite the entrance of the Indonesians shortly
afterwards was a sudden shock, which made an end to their dreams of
future independence.  The Papuans felt like they had been betrayed by
the world.

2. The New York Agreement was brought about under strong pressure from
the United States. At the end of the Eisenhower Administration the
State Department drafted a document that later formed the basis of the
New York Agreement. U.S. officials first proposed the idea of an UN
interim administration. Following insistence from the Kennedy White
House in early 1962, serious negotiations were started up between the
Indonesians and the Dutch. When these discussions reached an impasse,
the old State Department proposals were suddenly put on the table by a
U.S. diplomat named Ellsworth Bunker, who was operating as a United
Nations mediator in close cooperation with the State Department and
the White House. Following pressure from the Dutch some paragraphs on
self-determination were added in, but they were weakly worded as a
result of Indonesian pressure. There were certainly no clear plans for
a plebiscite on the basis of universal suffrage and individual vote –
which would have been hardly practicable in the isolated but densely
populated highland areas. Instead the documents stipulated that an
Indonesian-style Musjawarah, or “traditional consultation”, would be
an essential part of the Act of Free Choice. This “consultation”
allowed for manipulation from above. Thus, the foundations for the
inadequate Act of Free Choice were already laid down in the agreement
itself.

3. In 1962, when the New York Agreement was formulated, the
Indonesians were in a position to put strong pressure upon the Dutch.
The Republic of Indonesia had assembled, in the space of a few years,
an impressive invading force.  They had advanced weaponry, ships, and
airplanes that had been supplied by both the Americans and the
Russians. Earlier U.S. promises of military support for the Dutch, in
case of an Indonesian attack, were played down gradually during the
negotiations. The Dutch were thus confronted with a war that would
have to be fought out without American support. Moreover, in the
Netherlands itself a longing for better relations with Indonesia, its
former and dearest colony, was growing stronger. This mixture of
circumstances, arguments and sentiments forced the Dutch government to
give in.

4. Under these conditions, the role of the military in the Indonesian
victory of 1962 was undeniable and conspicuous. Indonesian soldiers
were well aware of this. When given access to New Guinea in October
1962, they took possession of the territory in a spirit of a
victorious occupational army. The Dutch slipped out under United
Nations protection – and for them that was an advantage indeed.  But
the Papuans had to cope with the soldiers and the other Indonesian
officials. From the beginning, the Indonesian army was the prime force
in the administration of the territory. This administration was
carried out in a very rough handed way, with hardly any appreciation
for the special character of Papuan worlds. For most Indonesians, West
Papua was a place of banishment. Yet, in the beginning at least, they
enjoyed taking over a comfortable colonial administration. The
typewriters, the hospital equipment, and other elements of the basic
infrastructure were taken away. Jobs of the Papuan elite were taken
over, the educational system graded down, and the civil society of
West Papua slipped down the road towards greater misery. After General
Suharto became President of Indonesia, the new minister of Foreign
Affairs, Adam Malik, visited the territory. Malik was shocked by the
desolation he found there. The Javanese civil servants had robbed the
country blind. Embitterment reigned everywhere, in the words of this
Indonesian minister  upon his return to Jakarta. Malik promised
improvement, but in effect his government brought increasing military
oppression. The first operations of the Papuan resistance had already
started in 1965, and were countered by Indonesian soldiers with
extreme violence. The number of victims is hard to determine, in large
part due to lack of access to the territory by foreign observers. All
together the casualties ran into thousands already by 1969. By most
estimations the violence increased until 1985 and then slowed down
afterwards. Yet it is still a harshly governed territory, but this is
outside the scope of my book.

---------------

Testimony of S. Eben Kirksey, Ph.D.
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

before the
U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment

September 22, 2010

“Crimes Against Humanity: When Will Indonesia’s Military Be Held
Accountable for Deliberate and Systematic Abuses in West Papua?”


Mr. Chairman first I would like to express thanks for your leadership.
  Along with Chairman Payne, Representative Patrick Kennedy, Members of
the Congressional Black Caucus, and the Progressive Caucus, you have
consistently reminded your fellow Members of Congress and counterparts
in the Administration of the grave abuses perpetrated by the
Indonesian military in the seemingly remote land of West Papua.  I
also want to acknowledge the many Papuan leaders sitting behind me
here in the audience today, who have travelled thousands of miles to
witness this historic occasion.

In 1998 I was awarded a grant from the United States Indonesia Society
to conduct anthropological research in West Papua.  At the time I was
intent on studying indigenous foodways for my undergraduate honours
thesis.  Human rights issues were not on my radar screen.

Weeks after I enrolled as an exchange student at Cenderawasih
University, in July 1998, I heard shots that hit two fellow students
at a small demonstration—Steven Suripatti, a law student, was shot in
the head and killed, and a high school girl, Corina Onim, was shot in
the leg as she watched the protest from the sidelines.

Days after this incident, I found myself trapped in a hotel, on the
island of Biak, while a massacre took place.  At dawn on July 6th,
1998, Indonesian security forces surrounded a group of Papuan
protestors, who were peacefully sleeping in the Biak harbor under the
Morning Star flag, West Papua’s banner of independence.  It was a
joint operation involving mobile brigade police (Brimob), army troops
(Kopasgad), a company of soldiers from the local barracks (Kodim), as
well as Navy personnel.  I could hear the troops firing into the
crowd.  Later I interviewed witnesses who watched soldiers load bodies
of the dead and dying into a small truck: “I counted fifteen people in
the first load,” one eyewitness told me.  “The truck came a second
time and I counted seventeen people inside.  When they opened up the
truck bed I could see lots of blood, in that small truck there was
lots of blood.”

Survivors from this initial assault were loaded onto Navy ships that I
could see from my hotel window.  People were taken to the middle of
the ocean and dumped overboard.  In the coming weeks, at least 32
decaying bodies washed ashore on Biak.  Some cadavers were missing
their heads, hands, or genitals.

In 1999 Human Rights Watch issued a report about these incidents and
called for the Indonesian government to exhume graves of the victims
in the presence of NGOs and forensic pathologists.   An official
inquiry was never launched.  This massacre took place on the heels of
President Suharto’s ousting—during the first moments of Indonesia’s
Era of Reform.  While Indonesian citizens in other parts of the
country were enjoying new-found freedoms, Papuans found themselves
under the thumb of government security forces who continued to enjoy
complete impunity.

The violence intensified in June 2001 when Indonesian police launched
a campaign in the remote region of Wasior targeting independence
activists that was aptly named “Operation Sweep and Crush.”  An
Amnesty International report found that “over 140 people were
detained, tortured or otherwise ill-treated during the course of the
operation.  One person died in custody as a result of torture while at
least seven people are believed to have been extrajudicially
executed.”  During Operation Sweep and Crush, a total of 55 houses in
Wasior were burned or otherwise destroyed by security forces.

The murder of Wellem Korwam, a 32-year-old health worker, illustrates
the extreme brutality perpetrated by Indonesian security forces during
Operation Sweep and Crush.   His body was cut in seven pieces and then
dumped into the sea.  Here is picture of some twenty people—health
workers, police officers, civil servants and civilians—struggling to
deal with a large plastic bag containing Korwam’s body.  The bag is
bulging with gas and floating in the water near a palm-fringed beach.
Mr. Chairman I will spare your Committee, and the public, the horror
of seeing the pictures of Mr. Korwam’s body once this bag was opened
up.  Instead I will describe the pictures.

The next photograph in the series was taken indoors—a man with plastic
gloves is arranging the torso in a white coffin.  It is a wide-angle
shot and one can see the white, black, and pink organs inside the
torso.  The subsequent picture is a jumble of seven different
body-parts: two legs, two arms, the head/torso and two other pieces of
the body’s trunk.  The mouth gapes open in a distorted yawn;
whitish-green eyes stare unfocused in different directions; the nose,
arms and ears are gone.  The final photo is of the burial site.
Cloths worn over some of the mourners’ mouths and noses helped stifle
the putrefying smell.  Mr. Chairman, I have the photographs of Mr.
Korwam’s body with me here today in this envelope.  At your
discretion, the photographs might be introduced to the congressional
record.

The Rome Statute gives the International Criminal Court in The Hague
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against humanity when perpetrators
enjoy impunity in their home countries.  As outrage about the
deliberate abuses against political leaders in West Papua grows here
in Washington, and in other countries around the world, Indonesian
soldiers and police officers should think twice before committing
future acts that violate national and international laws.

When U.S. citizens are murdered while living or travelling abroad,
there are clear legal precedents for trying suspects in our own
courts.  Two American schoolteachers, and one Indonesian, were shot
dead on August 31st, 2002, near the gold and copper mine of Freeport
McMoRan (FCX) in Timika, West Papua.  The shooting lasted about 45
minutes and was nearby an Indonesian military checkpoint where more
than 100 soldiers were stationed with Kostrad Battalion 515.  Eye
witnesses also placed Kopassus Special Forces soldiers at the crime
scene.

Indonesia’s own initial investigation, lead by Police Chief Made
Mangku Pastika, found “a strong possibility” that there were
Indonesian military shooters.    Pastika, and other senior police
investigators were transferred off of the case in late 2002, as the
Indonesian military stepped in to take charge of the investigation.

The FBI showed an interest in conducting their own murder
investigation from the outset.  But, Indonesian authorities were
initially hostile.  At first FBI agents were only permitted short
visits to Timika.  Their interviews were, initially, conducted in the
presence of Indonesian minders.   Despite repeated high-level requests
from the U.S. government, including a personal appeal by President
George W. Bush, the FBI had continual difficulties in gaining access
to witnesses and material evidence for many months.   By the time the
FBI hit the ground, the trail was cold.

Antonius Wamang, a Papuan farmer, was sentenced to life in prison for
participating in this attack by an Indonesian courtroom on November
7th, 2006.  Wamang has admitted to participating in this attack, but
it is clear that he was not acting alone.  Mr. Chairman, today I am
submitting a 33-page article for the Congressional Record, which was
published in a peer-reviewed journal, detailing Mr. Wamang’s ties to
the Indonesian military.  The Indonesian courts failed to
systematically evaluate evidence that Indonesian soldiers shot and
killed U.S. citizens.  Mr. Wamang, and his alleged military
accomplices, should be brought to trial in a U.S. courtroom.

The very day that Wamang was sentenced to life in prison, the Bush
Administration signaled a “new era of military co-operation” with
Indonesia.   In 2006 a new Pentagon program was announced that
provided U.S.$19 million for building Indonesian military capacity.
The next year, in December 2007, the U.S. Congress provided the
Indonesian military with U.S.$18.4 million in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) for the 2008 fiscal year.   For the Fiscal Year 2011,
the Administration has requested U.S.$22 million for FMF as well as
U.S.$1.8 million for the International Military Education Training
(IMET) program.  There are currently no legislated restrictions on
purchases of U.S. military equipment by the Indonesian military.

Widespread and systematic crimes continue to be perpetrated by
Indonesian security forces against Papuans who express desires for
political independence.   In the past twelve years of Indonesia’s
“Reform Era”, many Papuan leaders have been murdered, tortured, or
imprisoned for their political beliefs and aspirations.

Mr. Chairman, in this very tight budget year when people on both sides
of the aisle are calling for reduced spending, perhaps it is time to
rethink the logic that sends U.S. taxpayer dollars to support foreign
militaries.  In my personal opinion these funds should be cut off
completely.  If the Appropriations Committee decides to keep these
military aid programs in place, very real conditions and clearer
benchmarks should be attached to these programs.  The Indonesian
military should receive no more funding from the U.S. government until
the murderers of Wellem Korwam are brought to justice, until
Indonesian officials let forensic pathologists exhume the mass graves
on Biak.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this historic hearing.  With
your continued leadership the U.S. government will play a role in
ending Indonesian military impunity in West Papua.
_
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